

## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, March 28, 1973 B11

# ITT Hope of Ousting Allende Remote

By Jack Anderson

Any hope International Telephone and Telegraph may have of ousting Chile's President Salvador Allende, in the view of American Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, is unrealistic.

In a secret cable to the State Department, Davis reported that "prospects of military intervention for the foreseeable future are extremely small.

"It is held that military will turn blind eye to virtually any constitutional abuse, and Allende is smart enough to avoid abuse so flagrant as to force open that blind eye."

ITT hoped for military intervention in 1970 to block Allende's election. We have published confidential memos, which reveal the giant conglomerate was prepared to spend millions promoting economic collapse in Chile to force a military coup.

The memos show that the Central Intelligence Agency cooperated with ITT in planning this economic sabotage but that other American corporations such as General Motors and Ford would take no part in the scheme. The memos also blame the State Department for failing to take a tougher stand against Allende.

Inside sources say that ITT, in order to protect its investments in Chile from Allende's

Marxist policies, has continued to explore the prospects of removing Allende from power.

Ambassador Davis, however, sees little likelihood of this. Before we published the incriminating ITT memos, he summarized the situation in Chile for the State Department.

## Military Plotting

He reported "growing conviction in opposition parties, private sector and others that opposition is possible." He cited intelligence reports that "discontent and plotting in the military services have been substantial, greater."

But he concluded: "It is not our impression that Chile is yet on brink of showdown. In fact, there is some reason to believe that new opposition spirit could prove transitory..."

"My colleagues continue to warn me that events move slowly in Chile, or perhaps better said, Chileans have great ability to rush to the brink, embrace each other and back off.

"With Russian and East European help... and with some breaks, Chile just might be able to rock along for some time to come."

In his secret summary, however, the new American Ambassador suggested that "Al-

lende's course is working less well. If this trend continues, it will increase pressures on Allende to move toward radical solutions or in other directions.

"Allende's decisions may, in turn, sharpen the choices of his opposition and also of the military." Davis pointed out that "there is considerable variety in ways military might intervene."

Before ITT is likely to get its military coup, however, Davis suggested that public opposition to Allende would have to become "so overwhelming, and discontent so great, that military intervention is overwhelmingly invited.

"It is held that military will wait for this public repudiation to become more clear and more open than it is likely ever to be."

## Corporate Nation

With annual sales around \$7.5 billion and holdings in 67 countries, ITT is a veritable corporate nation. It has built an empire, like Britain's, upon which the sun never sets.

ITT directs its own intelligence operations, security system and foreign service. It deals with foreign governments at the highest levels—often through former political leaders, cabinet ministers and intelligence officers.

Among the world leaders who have turned up in ITT's corporate hierarchy are Paul Henri Spaak, former Belgian prime minister; Trygve Lie, the late U.N. Secretary-General; and John McCone, the former chief of our own Central Intelligence Agency.

Twice a month, ITT's managers gather alternately in New York City and Brussels to plan high strategy. Five of the top managers draw higher pay than President Nixon's \$200,000-a-year salary. And ITT's panjandrum, Harold Geenen, collects the highest salary in the world, \$766,755 a year.

These corporate rulers, working through McCone's inside contacts, were able to enlist the CIA in an abortive plot to block Allende's election and thus interfere in Chile's free election process. This illustrates the incestuous relationship that has grown up between ITT and the Nixon administration.

## Undersea Booby Trap

The Navy has awarded a \$26 million study contract to develop a secret, delayed-action torpedo to be called the "Cap-tor." It could be fired silently into an enemy harbor where it would remain a threat for weeks.

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## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, March 4, 1972 D 19

## 'Unleashing' Chiang Is Protested

By Jack Anderson

President Nixon's pledge in Peking to pull American military forces out of Taiwan, predictably, has raised howls from the Republican right.

The same hardheads, who called for President Truman in the 1950s to "unleash" Chiang Kai-shek, are now railing against Mr. Nixon for promising to remove the American lease. When old Chiang is at last unleashed, they warn in anguish, his island redoubt will be overrun by the Red Chinese.

Long before Mr. Nixon was invited to Peking, our military strategists fiercely debated whether Chiang could withstand an amphibious assault. Arguments are spelled out in secret working papers in possession.

The Pentagon study contends that Chiang's forces "are more than adequate" for defending Taiwan against an amphibious assault because Chiang's "priority . . . has been to regain control over the mainland. The study asserts, he has built a formidable military force which substantially exceeds the defense requirements for Taiwan."

The Chinese Communist threat to Taiwan, on the other hand, isn't regarded by the Pentagon as serious. The Defense Intelligence Agency has concluded from an exhaustive study of Chinese logistic capa-

bilities "that the CPR (Chinese Peoples Republic) could not mount major offensives on more than one front."

## Soviet Threat

Since Mao Tse-tung's main forces are tied up on the Soviet border, where Russia has now deployed nearly a million men, he would have trouble mounting "a major offensive against Taiwan."

In any event, the Pentagon strategists believe the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan in case of attack "should be more than adequate to deter the CPR."

The Central Intelligence Agency, after detailed survey of Taiwan's defenses, identified "four major and two minor beach areas suitable for amphibious landings."

Pentagon strategists drafted an elaborate scenario, citing the difficulties of an amphibious attack from the mainland, and concluded: "When the reserves are deployed, the GRC (Government, Republic of China) would outnumber the CPR threat in any sector by at least two to one. Overall, the GRC would outnumber the assault force by at least five to one."

Adds the secret Pentagon study: "If GRC control of the air and sea were to be threatened, or it appeared that a much larger amphibious attack were being launched, U.S. Navy and Air Force units

should be deployed. This should not require that the U.S. maintain additional forces in the Pacific."

Footnote: Countering these arguments, the U.S. mission on Taiwan has warned that "the CPR military capabilities will improve over the next decade with continued emphasis on the improvement of nuclear weapons capabilities."

As for Chiang's ability to throw back an amphibious assault, the mission contends: "The DOD report relies on the deployment of forces to acquire favorable ratios. This can be accomplished under ideal conditions, but rapid lateral movement is extremely difficult due to the communications network and terrain."

## Strange Reward

President Nixon has asked the Senate to promote a high-ranking diplomat who only 20 months ago was exposed for trying to cover up the My Lai massacre of Vietnamese civilians.

Secretary of State William Rogers put tall, balding James May at the head of the December 1 promotion list sent first to the White House, then forwarded to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It calls for May's promotion to the second highest level of foreign service officer.

The suave May, who dressed like a fashion plate even in muggy Quantangai province

where he was top civilian adviser, figured prominently in a House report on the massacre.

A special Armed Services Investigating subcommittee, in a report released July 15, 1970, described May's role in the cover-up this way:

"The Senior Province Advisor, Mr. James May, was a State Department foreign service officer free of any responsibility to Americal Division or its commander.

"The testimony clearly established that his headquarters was apprised of atrocity allegations by Vietnamese Government sources. It further established that members of his staff had discussed the allegation and its investigation with representatives of Americal Division, and with others . . .

"It further demonstrated that he had personally been informed of the allegations at several times during the investigation. Despite the evidence that his unit had demonstrated concern over the admittedly unusual allegations and its investigation, Mr. May claimed to have no recollection of the incident."

The House My Lai subcommittee, headed by the Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), said failure of May's headquarters to report the incident "raised the question about where the decision was made to suppress any reporting of the allegation."

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## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Feb. 25, 1972

D15

## Russia Moves to Counter Nixon

By Jack Anderson

President Nixon's aim in going to China was to reduce tensions in Asia, but it may not necessarily work out that way.

The Russians have suddenly started increasing their military shipments to both North Vietnam and North Korea. Intelligence reports also warn that the Kremlin is encouraging both countries to renew military action.

The Soviet strategy, apparently, is to spoil the Chinese-American detente. As evidence it may be having some subtle success, the intelligence cables suggest that the Chinese had intended a warmer welcome for Nixon but put a muffler on the affair to avoid antagonizing Hanoi and Pyongyang.

Not long after the President announced his intention to visit Peking, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny rushed to Hanoi. Intelligence reports say he warned the North Vietnamese that China might sell them out and offered them a friendship treaty. The rulers in Hanoi, not wishing to alienate China, rejected the treaty but accepted an offer of more military aid.

Not long afterward, a high-level Soviet delegation, headed by Politburo member Sharaf Rashidov, made a similar pitch in Pyongyang. Rashidov is reported to have encouraged the North Koreans to start skirmishes along their southern border.

The Central Intelligence Agency, meanwhile, has obtained a copy of a secret South Korean assessment of the North Korean menace.

South Korea's defense ministry says the CIA "has completed a secret study dated 15 November 1971 entitled 'The Strategy for North Korea's Invasion of South Korea.' The study was printed in 35 copies and may be the basis for current ROK (Republic of Korea) planning to strengthen Seoul's defenses."

## New Korean War?

Here are the highlights:

"1. North Korea will initiate war at any time it deems a decisive moment is at hand. Given a choice of timing, it will choose a winter attack over a summer attack.

"2. It will carry out attacks against the entire peninsula or against limited areas thereof . . .

"3. It will adopt a blitz-type strategy combining both regular and irregular warfare. It will not employ nuclear weapons.

"4. The North will seek an excuse to make an attack against the ROK claiming it was provoked into such an attack. If it is unable to find a suitable pretext, it will carry out irregular warfare . . .

"North Korea's basic objective is the communized unification of Korea by forceful means. It has almost completed its war preparations

and has secured military superiority over the ROK. It is waiting for the arrival of the so-called decisive moment.

"Because of the defeat it experienced in the Korean war, it has strengthened its winter warfare training and has improved its arms. It has indicated the possibility of shifting to an offensive posture . . . It has noted the weakness of ROK-UN forces in cold weather.

"In view of the above, it is believed that the North will place emphasis on winter operations but it will attack, regardless of season, at any time it decides a suitable pretext exists."

The CIA, giving its own assessment, claims "there is no evidence that North Korea is planning an imminent invasion." But on both sides of the 38th parallel, the Koreans are armed to the teeth and prepared for a resumption of their civil war. Passions are running high.

## Washington Whirl

**Anti-Jewish Handout**—For the past three years, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare has doled out \$85,000 annually to the anti-Semitic African-American Teachers Association. The funds are supposed to get ghetto drop-outs back to school. But the Association's magazine recently wrote that Jewish influence on the New York public school system

"spells death for the minds and souls of our black children." And one of the Association's leaders is Tyrone Woods, best known for his statement three years ago that Hitler "didn't make enough lampshades out of" Jews. The Anti-Defamation League is protesting the HEW grants.

**Go-Go Gauzza**—George Gauzza, the Interior Department bureaucrat who flouted federal law to help former Secretary Walter Hickel redecorate his office at public expense, has now begun to dip into the public till for his own pleasure. Gauzza recently left for an extended trip to Guam and Saipan to do "property inventories" in the Pacific Territories. "George was originally going to San Francisco," a spokesman said, "and it was decided that while on the coast he might as well go on to Guam and Saipan." Guam, after all, is only 6,194 miles out of his way.

**Baleful Bargirls**—State Department pacification experts fear that if the Communists take control of South Vietnam, there may be reprisals against more than 200,000 Vietnamese who have worked directly for Americans. Part of a confidential State Department study also deals with 80,000 Vietnamese bar girls who have catered to Americans. The girls are not sure they want to be left to the tender mercies of the moralistic Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.

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## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Feb. 18, 1972

B15

# U.S. Turns Back on Quemoy, Matsu

By Jack Anderson

President Nixon is prepared, as a gesture to Peking, to abandon U.S. support of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

Yet as Vice President, he was willing to risk nuclear warfare over the same offshore islands in 1958.

A secret study of the 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, prepared for the Pentagon by the Rand Corporation, claims that the United States was ready to use nuclear weapons to defend the islands.

Inside the policy councils, no one was more militant over the two tiny islands than Richard Nixon who now, ironically, considers both Quemoy and Matsu to be expendable.

This doesn't mean he will hand over the two islands to Chou En-lai as poker chips on the Peking conference table. But the United States no longer will help Chiang Kai-shek defend them.

The U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan itself, it should be emphasized, is still in effect. But the commitment won't continue to include Quemoy and Matsu.

U.S. military experts believe Chiang is quite capable of defending the islands without U.S. help. But they think he would be wiser to negotiate

an offshore island settlement with the Chinese Communists.

### Secret Study

The paperwork on this was started even before Nixon moved into the White House.

A secret study suggests that "several substantial reductions could be made in GRC naval forces (meaning Chiang's navy) were it to negotiate with the CPR (Chinese Communists) an offshore island settlement.

"First the GRC amphibious capability could be reduced by two-thirds. The ability to land 5,000 marines on the Penghus (guarding the approaches to Taiwan) as reinforcements would be more than adequate for the defense of that area. Such a reduction would free at least 2,900 men from the Navy, saving the GRC about \$820,000 annually in manpower costs, and obviating the need for further LST repairs . . .

"Secondly, GRC ocean control and surveillance forces could also be reduced, perhaps at least one-third, because operations along the mainland coast and in support of offshore island resupply would be unnecessary. This would save the GRC at least \$530,000 annually in manpower costs . . ."

The study also provides a

detailed analysis of the military threat to Taiwan and concludes that Chiang's forces could repulse a Chinese Communist invasion.

"The CIA intelligence survey of Taiwan identifies four major and two minor beach areas suitable for amphibious landings," states the survey.

It spells out in precise detail the likely battle scenario and concludes flatly: "When the reserves are deployed, the GRC would outnumber the CPR threat in any sector by at least two to one. Overall, the GRC would outnumber the assault force by at least five to one.

"As indicated previously, based on U.S. World War II and Korea experience, an attack-to-defense ratio of three to one is normally required to assure the success of an amphibious attacking (assuming the attacker can gain naval and air superiority)."

On this subject, the military experts believe Chiang has enough naval power to deter the Chinese Communists from attempting an amphibious assault.

### U.S. Support

Declares the study: "Since we seek to avoid a direct U.S.-CPR confrontation, we have assisted the GRC through MAP (military aid program) in developing a navy adequate

to: (1) patrol the coast; (2) resupply the offshore islands (and) Taiwan.

"The GRC navy can accomplish all these missions now. It will retain these capabilities through FY73 (fiscal year 1973) without major investments in new ships or craft largely because the CPR does not appear to be developing naval offensive forces."

U.S. officials have suggested in their secret discussions, meanwhile, that old Chiang Kai-shek has enough cash stashed away to pay more of his own military bills. He is holding the money to finance his dream of reconquering the Chinese mainland.

The U.S. mission in Taiwan has reported in a "secret working paper" that "we do know privately that the GRC has considerable sums of money in special funds, mostly marked for contingency use in mainland recovery."

The Americans, however, believe Chiang is so obsessed with his dream of returning to the mainland that he won't spend the invasion funds for any other purpose.

"The possibility that these funds would be used for routine military expenditures," states the report, "is remote, and they would be disbursed only as a last resort."

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**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jan. 18, 1972 B11

# Protesters Leak Their Own Secrets

By Jack Anderson

The planners in the White House basement, who howled in pain over our disclosure of their India-Pakistan secrets, have slipped fragments from the same secret documents to their friends in the press.

This illustrates how the White House uses official secrecy to control the flow of news to the public. Favorable facts are leaked out; unfavorable news is suppressed.

The official leakers are now spreading the word that President Nixon's pro-Pakistan policy was not the disaster it appeared but really saved West Pakistan from dismemberment.

As evidence, the boys in the basement leaked a few selective secrets to our column-writing colleague, Joseph Alsop, who has excellent contacts at the highest levels of government.

Alsop stated "on positive authority" that the U.S. government had "conclusive proof" of India's intention to crush the main body of the Pakistan army in West Pakistan. This positive proof, he wrote, was "the centerpiece of every one of the CIA's daily reports to the White House during the crisis period."

We have read the CIA's daily reports to the White House during the India-Pakistan war. They are stamped "Top Secret Umbra," a designation reserved for the darkest of the CIA's secrets.

## Alsop's 'Proof'

Alsop told us he never read the CIA reports himself. He had no way of knowing, therefore, that his sources gave him only part of the story.

These CIA digests, true enough, raised the possibility of an Indian attempt to crush West Pakistan. But the same digests also suggested India would accept an early cease-fire.

Here is a typical excerpt: "There have been reports that (Indian Prime Minister) Gandhi would accept a cease-fire and international mediation as soon as East Bengal had been liberated . . . On the other hand, we have had several recent reports that India now intends not only to liberate East Bengal but also to straighten its borders in Kashmir and to destroy West Pakistan's air and armored forces."

The strongest CIA warning was sent to the White House on December 10. "According to a source who has access to information on activities in Prime Minister Gandhi's office," declared the report, "as soon as the situation in East Pakistan is settled, Indian forces will launch a major offensive against West Pakistan."

But the CIA also took note of repeated Indian assurances to American Ambassador Ken

Keating that India has no territorial ambitions and wished only to end the conflict with the least possible bloodshed.

## Dubious 'Proof'

It is clear from the secret documents in our possession that the CIA had no "conclusive proof" of an Indian plan to dismember West Pakistan. The CIA had received a number of reports that a major Indian offensive might be imminent on the western front. But these were discounted by both the State and Defense Departments.

Only Henry Kissinger, the President's foreign policy czar, seemed eager to believe the worst.

Alsop's sources also told him that President Nixon intervened with the Kremlin, threatening "an ugly showdown," to stop Mrs. Gandhi's army from carving up West Pakistan.

In response, Alsop claims that the Kremlin hurriedly dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznestsov to New Delhi on December 12 to tell Mrs. Gandhi not to attack West Pakistan.

The secret CIA report on his mission, however, doesn't mention any ultimatum against attacking West Pakistan.

"Vasily Kuznestsov arrived in India on 12 December to discuss the political recognition of Bangladesh by the So-

viet Union . . .," according to the CIA. "Kuznestsov has told Indian officials that the Soviet Union is not prepared to recognize Bangladesh until Dacca falls and until the Indian army successfully liberates Bangladesh from Pakistani forces."

The question of an Indian offensive against West Pakistan was brought up the next day by Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Pegov. Reported the CIA:

"Pegov pointed out that India has achieved a marvelous military victory. Pakistan is no longer a military force, and it is therefore unnecessary for India to launch an offensive into West Pakistan to crush a military machine that no longer exists."

"If India should decide to take Kashmir, Pegov added, the Soviet Union would not interfere, but India would have to accomplish this objective within the shortest possible time."

Joseph Alsop is an enterprising and conscientious columnist. He acknowledged to us that "it is possible to be lied to on the very highest level." But he assured us his source had "never lied before."

The evidence in our possession, however, suggests that the White House is playing peekaboo with CIA secrets to distort the truth.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 17, 1972 B11

# Europe First, Laird Tells NATO

By Jack Anderson

In a secret speech he thought would never get back to the Senate, Defense Secretary Mel Laird has told his counterparts in the North Atlantic Alliance to pay no attention to Senate resolutions about troop cuts.

He has also promised them that Europe will now be given "first priority" over Southeast Asia in building up U.S. combat readiness.

"I can inform you," he told NATO defense ministers in Brussels last month, "that our forces in Europe today are at the highest level of manning and effectiveness compared with any time during the past five years . . . ."

"The turnover of personnel in our Army units is easing because of the substantial withdrawals which we have made from Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam . . . ."

"First priority for combat readiness for all of our forces has now been assigned to Europe, and that priority will continue."

Laird tried to reassure the NATO planners that they need not worry about Senate Majority Leader Mike Mans-

field's efforts to reduce U.S. forces in Europe.

"I appreciate your concern," he said, "about such developments as Senator Mansfield's recent proposal to set a lower ceiling on U.S. forces in Europe . . . ."

"I have on several occasions pointed out (to defense ministers) that we will have amendments from time to time on . . . defense legislation considered by the Congress but that I was confident that we had the votes and the support in Congress to see that these amendments were not enacted in the law."

"And I hope that there is not an over-reaction on the part of our friends and allies when amendments like this are introduced and discussed before our Congress, because the congressional process will work its will. But I can assure you very confidently that the situation is such that we do presently have the votes . . . ."

## Ignore Senate

"This most recent action of the United States Senate in connection with the defense appropriations bill should, of course, be of no surprise to anyone in this room as I pre-

dicted that this action would take place at our last meeting."

"I advised you then, and I advise you again, that similar amendments will be offered by various members of the Senate, particularly the majority leader of the United States Senate, but we are in a position where I am quite confident that we will be successful in resisting this kind of unilateral action."

Laird also called for the establishment of a tactical air control system for Europe and a NATO fleet in the Mediterranean.

"I must be blunt," he declared. "We handicap ourselves unnecessarily because we lack centralized command and control of our (tactical air) resources in Europe . . . ."

"Our own experience with air operations in Southeast Asia made it abundantly clear that an adequate and integrated control system was needed to use most effectively the air assets of our four services and our allies . . . I believe the same applies here in Europe."

The Defense Secretary ticked off some secret military details. Then he added: "We

should not delay the formation of a NATO standing naval force in the Mediterranean, which would sail under the alliance, because of the international negotiations regarding command boundaries . . . ."

"We should act now to create a standing force that can patrol the Mediterranean Sea with the same kind of freedom which the Soviets have."

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**Jack Anderson**

## And in Other Secret Memos...

ALTHOUGH the precarious peace in the Middle East still hasn't been broken, a settlement is likely to prove as rocky and tortuous as ever.

This is illustrated in painful detail by the classified cable traffic between the State Department and our United Nations delegation during last month's General Assembly debate on the Middle East. The secret messages also provide a fascinating insight into the UN cloakrooms.

The U.S. worked tirelessly behind the scenes to find a compromise resolution which both the Arabs and Israelis could accept and which would point the way toward further negotiations.

But the Arabs stuck stubbornly to their position, and the Israelis were equally intransigent. In the end, a resolution passed with the Israelis opposed and the U.S. abstaining.

The resolution calls on Israel to surrender Arab territory it had seized in the 1967 war. This was sought last February by UN mediator Gunnar Jarring.

The Israelis are so adamantly opposed to Jarring's proposal, however, that there was endless haggling in the backrooms over the reference in the resolution to Jarring's mission.

Here's how an "eye-only" telegram from America's UN delegation to the State Department describes a meeting between U.S. Ambassador George Bush and Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad:

Ambassador Bush . . . sought out Formin Riad in UN Indonesian Lounge to discuss Egyptian draft resolution re Middle East . . . Noting that Egyptian draft resolution appeared from initial reading to be generally satisfactory, Bush stated that major stumbling block for USG (U.S. government) was placing of language re Jarring mission in operative paragraph section . . . Bush asked if Riad willing to consider removal of this language from operative section to preamble.

"Riad replied in negative but not before he stressed that for Egyptians inclusion of this language in operative section not repeat not merely semantic exercise, on contrary, Egypt convinced that Israel trying to get out of giving favorable reply to Jarring and that only way to force Israel to do so is by means of explicit UN resolution."

The United States re-

sponded to the impasse with several proposed changes. The reaction by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban illustrates how tightly the lines were drawn on both sides. This is told in the following excerpts from a telegram marked "Eyes only-Specat-Exclusive: "

"Bush . . . had meeting the Formin Eban this afternoon . . . Eban said Israel could not repeat not accept USG proposal . . . He noted . . . that Jarring has not been too helpful and characterized him as 'negativistic individual.' On other hand, he opined that if Jarring would make move toward Israel, 'We'll see what we can do to help him.' Summing up, Eban expressed continued Israeli unhappiness with draft resolution even with changes."

At another meeting, Eban expressed deep concern the resolution might contain too favorable a mention of the Jarring proposal for withdrawal from occupied territories.

"He observed, however," said a secret telegram to the State Department, "that on political grounds Israel not have any reference to Jarring but appreciated that parliamentary reasons may dictate need for some thing . . ."

"Both Eban and Tekoah (Israel's UN ambassador) summed up that from Israel point of view, best course would be to limit resolution language to 'complimentary reference to Jarring' . . ."

"Eban then reiterated that Israel ready to accept fallback position which would involve reference to Jarring in preamble with operative para simply calling on Secretary General to reactivate Jarring mission."

Despite such patient bargaining over such seemingly minute matters of wording, the U.S. effort to work out a compromise resolution ultimately failed. The resolution that passed called on Israel to surrender the occupied territory.

Meantime, the United States has promised Israel a continued supply of F-4 fighter jets. This, it is hoped, might soften the Israeli opposition to the UN resolution or some other plan involving withdrawal from the lands.

But if the niggling, frustrating round of discussions at the UN last month is any indication, the bargaining is likely to be long and bitter.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

# The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Jan. 14, 1972

D15

## Rep. Whalley and Public Funds

By Jack Anderson

Rep. J. Irving Whalley (R-Pa.), a power on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a former United Nations delegate, has taken illegal kickbacks from employees, padded his payroll and chiseled House funds to pay for his Christmas gifts.

The Windber, Pa., wheeler-dealer has been cheating the taxpayers this way quite methodically behind a respectable front as a church elder, bank president and legislator-diplomat.

President Nixon named him in 1969 to a one-year term at the U.N., where he spoke for the U.S. on such subjects as Red China, Korea and the U.N. budget. But while the world weighed his words at the U.N. Whalley was gouging the taxpayers in his Pennsylvania district like a back-country Bobby Baker.

We reported last September that Whalley had demanded kickbacks from a former aide, and we have been investigating his activities ever since.

We can now prove that he has put more than a dozen editors, politicians and businessmen on the public payroll. Many were required to give him kickbacks in the form of personal services; others give kickbacks in goods; some were compelled to pay their own office expenses, and sometimes even Whalley's expenses, from their House salaries.

We can also show that Whalley raided House stationery funds, which regulations say must be used by members solely "for the purpose of stationery and other supplies."

He stretched the regulations to include book ends, scarves and pen-and-pencil sets, which he then gave out as Christmas gifts. The recipients, of course, were unaware that as taxpayers they had helped pay for their own gifts.

### Fiscal Finagling

In one of the many cases we investigated, Whalley paid for his political literature with U.S. Treasury funds. Here's how he worked it:

One of Whalley's staunch political allies is C. Robert Collary, proprietor of Capitol Press, a non-union printing shop in Duncanville, Pa. A pillar of his community, Collary is also a powerful GOP committeeman in Blair County and chairman of a Republican "zone."

We discovered that Collary has done more than \$1,500 in free printing for the congressman, much of it political.

Ordinarily, a congressman would pay for the printing out of his campaign contributions. Instead, Whalley used the House Disbursing Office almost like it were his personal checking account.

Checks drawn at Whalley's order from the House show that Whalley put Collary on

the payroll as a "staff" worker in 1967, paying him \$997 that year. In fiscal 1971, Whalley paid him another \$5,932.

Collary has kicked back \$1,500 to \$2,000 to Whalley in the form of free printing.

In a long talk with my associate Les Whitten, Collary at first said his free printing for Whalley amounted only to a "little letter press work." He later admitted it could have amounted to as much as \$2,000 but said this might include \$300 he spent on his travels for Whalley.

Asked whether he regarded the free printing as a kickback, Collary snapped back: "Absolutely not. Everything was on the up and up."

Whalley told us that such arrangements were common in Congress, although this runs counter to our experience. He explained that by hiring staff members for brief periods at a time in various parts of his district, he saves taxpayers the cost of opening up field offices in a variety of towns.

We will have more reports on the 11-year House veteran in future columns.

### Hanoi's Game

An amazing account of how Hanoi is playing Russia and China against each other is contained in a secret CIA report in our possession.

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Soviet President Nik

lai Podgorny competed with each other, according to the report, to offer North Vietnam more aid.

The report is based upon the confidential remarks picked up by the CIA, of high Foreign Ministry officials named Hoang Muoi. Here are the highlights:

"Muoi stated that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai had made a secret trip to Hanoi following the July, 1971, visit of Dr. Kissinger to Peking. Chou assured the DRV (North Vietnamese government) of continued Chinese support."

"On the subject of aid, Muoi stated that the Chinese, in order to convince the DRV of their continued support had agreed to give more aid in the 1971-72 period. The Soviets were thus forced to increase their aid in order to balance off the Chinese assistance."

"The Soviet aid agreement which resulted from Soviet President Podgorny's visit in October, was bigger than the 1970 agreement."

"Muoi said that during the Podgorny visit, the Soviets proposed a friendship treaty with the DRV. Muoi said the DRV refused the offer because it would have certainly antagonized China and, in any event, the DRV does not need such a treaty to get what it wants from the Soviets."

Bell-McClure Syndicate



**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Jan. 12, 1972 B11

# Secret Cables on Pakistan Quoted

By Jack Anderson

Secret diplomatic cables demonstrate graphically how the United States used the threat of large-scale military aid to Pakistan as a psychological weapon against India during the recent South Asian war.

The cables also show that, while direct U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan were ruled out from the start, the United States came within an ace of providing backdoor weapons assistance through several of Pakistan's Arab allies.

The backdoor scheme was never adopted, but the cables show that the United States wanted India to continue to think the possibility was imminent, thus strengthening Pakistan's position.

The most revealing of the cables was addressed to the American Embassies in Saudi Arabia and New Delhi:

"In view of intelligence reports spelling out Indian military objectives in West Pakistan, we do not want in any way to ease GOI's (Government of India's) concern re help Pakistan might receive from outside sources.

"Consequently, embassy should give GOI no repeat no assurances re third country transfers." The secret cable was signed by Under Secretary of State John Irwin.

Another cable from Irwin to the U.S. Embassy in Jordan shows that King Hussein was

under heavy pressure from Pakistan for arms aid and that he, in turn, was putting the heat on the United States to help furnish it.

"You should tell King Hussein we fully appreciate heavy pressure he feels himself under by virtue of request from Pakistan," Irwin instructed U.S. Ambassador L. Dean Brown.

"We are nevertheless not yet in a position to give him definite response. Whole subject remains under intensive review at very high level of USG (U.S. Government).

"We are fully alive to your delicate situation in not being able to give definite answer to King's urgent pleas. But we ask you to bear with us and put situation to Hussein in best light possible."

## Undersea Wealth

The big world powers have been greedily eying the vast mineral wealth on the ocean bottom. But feckless United Nations attempts to settle the issue of ownership have all but collapsed.

The confusion has now led the Defense Department into scheming with Russia to swap our rights to the mineral deposits for a shaky guarantee of total freedom of the seas.

These are among the alarming secret findings of an unusual, two-man task force assigned to investigate the problem by Senate Interior Chairman Henry Jackson, (D-Wash.).

Senator Jackson feared that the State Department might surrender U.S. sea bottom rights, so he dispatched two trusted Senate experts to the U.N. Seabed Committee in Geneva last summer.

The two aides, Charles Cook, a land and mineral law specialist, and Merrill Englund, the conservation-minded chief aide to Sen. Lee Metcalf, (D-Mont.) have now readied their draft report on the subject.

Entitled "The Law and the Seas Crisis," the nine-page draft agrees with the Nixon administration that the United States must guard its stake in the ocean's fish, minerals, gas, oil and other treasures.

But while the administration is challenging the claims of Ecuador and Peru to sovereignty 200 miles offshore, the Senate observers recommend we consider adopting the 200-mile limit ourselves. We presently claim a 12-mile limit.

The switch would cause consternation at the State Department, which is upholding the right of American tuna boats to fish inside Ecuador's 200-mile limit.

Special criticism is reserved for the unusual dealings between the Defense Department and the Soviet Union over the ocean wealth. The report warns that Defense, "supported by the U.S.S.R.," is trying to get a formal world guarantee that warships can go anywhere they want.

"We fear," states the report, "that the Defense Department might urge the administration to abandon its deep-sea bed mining objectives . . . as a trade off."

## Quickie Auto Titles

Alabama, known for its quickie divorces, has now developed a new legal racket: quickie auto registrations.

This is a great convenience for car thieves, reckless drivers and motorists with unsafe cars.

To test how the racket works, a car was selected from a nationwide stolen-car alert. The make, year and serial number, together with \$30 were mailed to Probate Judge Leland Enzor of Andalusia, Ala.

Fast as you can jump-wire a jeep, Enzor sent back a registration and Alabama tags to a general delivery box in downtown Manhattan.

We questioned Enzor's chief clerk, T. Wayne Daughtry, about the quickie tags. He said two other Alabama judges also service out-of-state drivers. He says Enzo chases \$2 a tag and handles a brisk 30 to 35 out-of-state registrations a day.

To douse the wildfire, Rep. Bill Ryan (D-N.Y.) has asked the Justice Department to help him draft a bill to end the registration-by-mail racket.

Wall-McClure Syndicate

## Text of Memo on Indian-Pakistan War

WASHINGTON, Jan. 14.—Following is the text of a memorandum on a meeting of a National Security Council committee on Indian-Pakistan hostilities, made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson:

## SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE JOINT STAFF  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF  
STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301  
8 DECEMBER 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR  
RECORD

SUBJECT: Washington Special Action Group meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities, 8 December 1971

1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100, Wednesday, 8 December to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

## 2. ATTENDEES

A. PRINCIPALS: Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A., Gen. John Ryan, J.C.S., Mr. Donald MacDonell, A.I.D., Mr. David Packard, Defense, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State.

B. OTHERS: Mr. Maurice Williams, A.I.D., Mr. John Waller, C.I.A., Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C., Mr. Samuel Hoskinson, N.S.C., Mr. Harold Stauders, N.S.C., Mr. Arnold Selden, Defense, Mr. James Noyes, Defense, Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State, Mr. Samuel De Palma, State, Mr. Bruce Laing, State, Mr. David Schneider, State, Mr. Joseph Sisco, State, Rear Adm. Robert Welander, O.J.C.S., Capt. Howard Kay, O.J.C.S., Group 4 downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years.

3. Summary: Dr. Kissinger suggested that India might be attempting, through calculated destruction of Pak armored and air forces to render Pakistan impotent. He requested that the Jordanian interest in assisting Pakistan not be turned off, but rather kept in a holding pattern. He asked that Pak capabilities in Kashmir be assessed.

4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. In the East, the Indians have broken the line at Comilla. Only major river crossings prevent them from investing Dacca. The Indians are advancing rapidly throughout East Pakistan. All major Pak L.O.C.'s in the East are now vulnerable. In the West, the Paks are now claiming Punch, inside the Indian border. However, the Paks are admitting fairly heavy casualties in the fighting. Tank battles are apparently taking place in the Sind/Rajasthan area. Mrs. Gandhi has indicated that before heading a U.N. call for cease-fire, she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities. Thus far only India and Bhutan have recognized Bangladesh. It is believed that the Soviets have held off recognition primarily so as not to rupture relations with the Paks. Soviet action on the matter of recognition, however, may be forthcoming in the near future.

5. Mr. Sisco inquired how long the Paks might be expected to hold out in East Pakistan, to which Mr. Helms replied 48 to 72 hours. The time to reach the ultimate climax is probably a function of the difficulties encountered in river crossings.

6. Assessing the situation in the West, General Ryan indicated that he did not see the Indians pushing too hard at this time, rather they seem content with a holding action.

7. Dr. Kissinger asked how long it would take to shift Indian forces from East to West. General Ryan said it might take a reasonably long time to move all the forces, but that the airborne brigade could be moved quickly, probably within a matter of five or six days.

8. Dr. Kissinger inquired about refugee aid. After a discussion with Mr. Williams it was determined that only a very small number of U.S. dollars earmarked for refugee relief was actually entering the Indian economy. Contrary to the sense of the last meeting, the Indians have actually lost foreign exchange in the process of caring for refugees. In any event, the entire relief effort is currently suspended in both India and Pakistan.

9. Dr. Kissinger then emphasized that the President has made it clear that no further foreign exchange, PL-480 commodities, or development loans could be assigned to India without approval of the White House. Mr. Williams stated there was no problem of anything sliding through.

10. Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be. Mr. Williams said that the only other possible option was taking a po-



Associated Press  
David Packard

sition concerning aid material currently under contract. This however would be a very messy problem inasmuch as we would be dealing with irrevocable letters of credit. Mr. Williams further stated that we would have to take possession of material that was being consigned to the Indians by U.S. contractors and thus would be compelled to pay U.S. suppliers, resulting in claims against the U.S.G.

11. Mr. Packard said that all of this could be done, but he agreed that it would be a very laborious and difficult problem. He further elaborated that all the items involved would have to be located, the United States would have to take ownership, settle with suppliers, locate warehousing, etc. Nevertheless, if such was desired it could be done. Mr. Williams said that in a very limited way this type of action had been taken against some Mid-East countries, but that it had taken years to settle the claims.

12. Dr. Kissinger asked how India was handling next year's development loan program, to which Mr. Williams responded that nothing was under negotiation at the present time.

13. Dr. Kissinger inquired about next year's [A.I.D.] budget. Mr. Williams stated that what goes into the budget did not represent a commitment. Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything into the budget for A.I.D. to India. It was not to be leaked that A.I.D. had put money in the budget for India, only to have the "wicked" White House take it out.

14. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the key issue if the Indians turn on West Pakistan is Azad Kashmir. If the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a U.S. ally to go down completely while we participate in a blockade? Can we allow the Indians to scare us off, believing that if U.S. supplies are needed they will not be provided?

15. Mr. Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Pakistan. Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Minister Singh told Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory.

16. Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madame Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chinese intervention in the West. She said that the So-

viet had cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Laddakh but that the Soviets have promised to take appropriate counteraction if this should occur. Mr. Helms indicated that there was no Chinese build-up at this time but, nevertheless, even without a build-up they could "make motions and rattle the sword."

17. Turning then to the question of military support of Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger referred to an expression of interest by King Hussein relative to the provision of F-104's to Pakistan, and asked how we could get Jordan into a holding pattern to allow the President time to consider the issue. Dr. Kissinger also asked whether we should attempt to convey to the Indians and the press that a major attack on West Pakistan would be considered in a very serious light by this country.

18. Mr. Packard explained that we could not authorize the Jordanians to do anything that the U.S.G. could not do. If the U.S.G. could not do it, we could not allow Jordan to do so. If a third country had material that the U.S.G. did not have, that was one thing, but we could not allow Jordan to transfer the 104's unless we make a finding that the Paks, themselves, were eligible to purchase them from us directly.

19. Dr. Kissinger suggested that if we had not cut the sale of arms to Pakistan, the current problem would not exist. Mr. Packard agreed.

20. Dr. Kissinger suggested that perhaps we never really analyzed what the real danger was when we were turning off the arms to Pakistan.

21. Mr. Packard suggested that another consideration in the Jordan issue is that if Jordan delivers this equipment we would be expected to replace it. Ambassador Johnson stated we do not have any more M.A.P. left.

22. Dr. Kissinger stated that what we may be witnessing is a situation where, in a country [India] equipped and supported by the Soviets may be turning half of Pakistan into an important state and the other half into a vassal. We must consider what other countries may be thinking of our action.

23. Mr. Helms asked about our CENTO relationships with Pakistan. Ambassador Johnson stated we had no legal obligations towards Pakistan in the CENTO context. Dr. Kissinger agreed but added that neither did we have legal obligations toward India in 1962 when we formulated the air defense agreement. We must consider what would be the impact of the current situation in the larger complex of world affairs.

24. Dr. Kissinger said that we must look at the problem in terms of Security Council guarantees in the Mid-East and the impact on other areas. We must look at the military supply situation. One could make a case, he argued, that we have done everything two weeks too late in the current situation.

25. Mr. Packard stated that perhaps the only satisfactory outcome would be for us to stand fast, with the expectation that the West Paks could hold their own.

26. Ambassador Johnson said that we must examine the possible effects that additional supplies for Pakistan might have. It could be that eight F-104's might not make any difference once the real war in the West starts. They could be considered only as a token. If, in fact, we were to move in West Pakistan we would be in a new ball game.

27. Ambassador Johnson said that one possibility would be our reply to Foreign Minister Singh, in which we could acknowledge the Indian pledge that they do not have territorial designs. He also stated we must also consider the fact that the Paks may themselves be trying to take Kashmir.

28. After discussing various possible commitments to

## Terms Used in Text

A.I.D.—Agency for International Development.  
Azad Kashmir—Free Kashmir, name of Pakistani-held parts of Kashmir.  
CENTO—Central Treaty Organization.  
C.I.A.—Central Intelligence Agency.  
F-104—Starfighter jet aircraft.  
J.C.S.—Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
L.O.C.—Line(s) of communication.  
M.A.P.—Military Assistance Program.  
N.S.C.—National Security Council.  
O.J.C.S.—Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
PL-480—Public Law 480, governing surplus food sent abroad.  
S.S. Buckeye State—American vessel strated in a Pakistani port.  
U.S.G.—United States Government.  
U.S.N.—United States Navy.

both Pakistan and India. Mr. Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you don't win, don't get involved. If we were to attempt something it would have to be with a certainty that it would affect the outcome. Let's not get in if we know we are going to lose. Find some way to stay out.

29. Mr. Williams suggested that we might now focus efforts for a cease-fire in West Pakistan. Ambassador Johnson stated this might, however, stop the Paks from moving into Kashmir.

30. Dr. Kissinger asked for an assessment of the Pak capabilities and prospects in Kashmir. He asked C.I.A. to prepare an assessment of the international implications of Mrs. Gandhi's current moves. He indicated that he should develop an initial stand on the military supply question. He reiterated that he desired to keep Hussein in a "holding pattern" relative to the latter's expression of support for Pakistan and that he should not be turned off. The U.S.G. should indicate to Hussein that we do not consider trivial his feelings in this matter.

31. Turning to the question of the blockade, Ambassador Johnson said that both India and Pakistan have taken blockade action, even though the Pak blockade is essentially a paper blockade. Dr. Kissinger said that we should also protest to the Paks. Ambassador Johnson indicated we do not have a legal case to protest the blockade. The belligerent nations have a right to blockade when a state of war exists. We may think we do not and we may question how it is carried out. We have, in fact, normally expressed our concern. On the other hand we have no problem in protesting the incident of the S.S. Buckeye State.

32. Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even handed. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does not want to be even handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the United States. Dr. Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. "The Lady" is cold blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President. Ambassador Keating, he suggested is offering enough reassurance on his own.

33. Addressing briefly the question of communal strife in East Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger asked whether anyone would be in a position to know that massacres were occurring at the time when they took place. Mr. Helms indicated that he might not know immediately, but we certainly would know after a massacre occurred.

34. The meeting was adjourned at 12:10.

/S/ H. N. KAY  
H. N. KAY  
U.S. Ambassador  
South Asia/M.A.P. Branch, JS  
Extension 72400

**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Feb. 2, 1972

C23

# Memos Bare Deception in War Policy

**By Jack Anderson**

Classified documents in our possession reveal, unhappily, that deception is still the official policy in Vietnam.

The raw facts about the Vietnam war go through a filtering and flavoring process, which can be ascribed partly to a natural desire to make American troops look as heroic as possible, partly to the Pentagon's determination to portray the war as the top brass want the world to see it.

A classified memo to all top U.S. officials in the pacification program, for example, bluntly tells them to be misleading at command briefings. These are special briefings for visiting newsmen and dignitaries. The memo, therefore, is an order to flavor the well of truth at its source.

Small wonder that Brig. Gen. James Herbert, a top U.S. deputy in the pacification program, ordered that "Overall security classification will be SECRET."

Dated Sept. 8, 1971, the memo mentions the disaster-ridden programs for helping war victims and for persuading the Vietcong and North Vietnamese to defect. U.S. officials in charge of these programs are directed only to "submit material which reflects progress" for the briefings.

General Herbert notes the briefing program is aimed at creating a picture of "progress made in the Republic of Vietnam."

To carry out this aim, all pacification officials must "develop 10 or 12 high impact indicators that say persuasively that much progress has been made; that our effort has not been a fruitless venture; that we have helped to establish conditions and build systems that at least give the Republic of Vietnam an opportunity to choose its future course of events."

"Final thought should be that a strong, broadly based military establishment has been created in RVN (South Vietnam) that will be difficult to destroy by military action..."

**Army-Inspired Slogans**

Our Vietnamese allies are even more blatant in faking success where none exists. A classified U.S. translation of an order by the late Lt. Gen. Do Cao Tri explains all those slogans that visitors to Vietnam are shown, as evidence of pro-Saigon sentiment, in hamlets and along the roads.

Soldiers and civilians in his military region were ordered by Gen. Tri to "display national flags at every village/hamlet office and person's home. Paint national flags

20x27 centimeters on the outer walls of the homes."

"Draw as many of the following slogans as possible on the blank walls: 'To coalesce with the Communists is suicide,' 'We are determined not to concede any land to the Communists,' 'To Chieu Hoi (to defect) is the only way to end the war and restore peace.'

"Depending on the local situation, all utilization of leaflets, slogans, and banners must be exploited to the fullest. These operations must be completed in one week... Results should be reported to (Tri) and should include... the number of villages and hamlets where flags were displayed, and the number of slogans, leaflets, and banners distributed at the localities."

Tri added menacingly that his army units should discipline people who do not put out the flags.

This attitude of fakery and falsehood extends down to every level. For example, Americans have been repeatedly told about the increasing number of hamlets which are secure from Communist control.

A high U.S. pacification official, Wilbur Wilson, tells in a confidential memo, dated Aug. 19, 1971, how he cut two Vietcong-controlled hamlets out of a district simply by gerrymandering the district Tammany-style.

"The District Chief has recommended that the boundaries of these two hamlets be changed," Wilson told his superiors. "I indicated to the District Senior Advisor that he could assure that this recommendation would be approved, and the August HES (hamlet survey) should reflect no (Viet cong-controlled) hamlets."

Perhaps U.S. officials simply are sick of the truths in Vietnam, and would rather read soft, sweet lies. As a symptom of this, we can quote from a memo written to his aides by Richard Funkhouser, Pacification Head for a giant area north of Saigon.

"I plan to visit provinces and districts," he advised his deputies down the line. Each division director, he said, should be prepared to give him three pieces of good news about programs that might possibly be used to show "accomplishments."

**Intelligence Reports**

Helicopter Mystery—The British have picked up mysterious helicopter activity on their side of the Hong Kong border. The secret speculation is that this may be a dramatic attempt to block the escape of high-ranking Chinese defectors.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Feb. 1, 1972 B11

# U.S. Losing War, Hanoi Said to Feel

By Jack Anderson

The latest intelligence reports indicate that Hanoi has no intention of settling the war in Indochina at the conference table.

It is also evident that the latest Communist drives in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam are coordinated by Hanoi.

Communist cadres in all three countries are spreading the word, according to one secret CIA cable, "that the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina is only a matter of time and that the three states of Indochina are now joined together to fight the U.S. openly anywhere in Indochina."

A typical cadre briefing was given recently by a high-ranking Pathet Lao colonel named Vanna at a secret site in the Muong Phalane area of Laos. The CIA was able to get a detailed, 18-page account of the secret meeting.

"Vanna said that the U.S. is losing the war in South Vietnam and that is the reason President Nixon is disengaging from Indochina," recounts the CIA.

"Also, the U.S. Congress and the U.S. people have openly advocated the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina and the reduction of aid to the government of South Vietnam.

"He added that the joining of Cambodia with Vietnam and Laos in common battle against the U.S. has united In-

dochina, and that the three countries as a united force will openly fight the U.S. anywhere in Indochina.

"Vanna commented, however, that... the U.S. withdrawal will not be easily accomplished. The U.S. will probably disengage aggressively in order to show its strength to the world and to show that it has not lost the war in Indochina.

"Vanna explained that the U.S. will not admit defeat and will continue its 'support' to the South Vietnamese, RLG (Royal Lao Government) and Lon Nol 'puppets' (Cambodia).

## U.S. Elections

"If Nixon wins the 1972 U.S. elections, the N.S. (is expected) to conduct a longer and more vigorous Indochina war. If the Democrats win, then the U.S. can be expected to terminate the war more quickly.

In any event, he explained, the U.S. will eventually disengage, and the U.S. elections will only indicate whether it will disengage more quickly or more slowly.

"Vanna noted that the North Vietnamese allies remain firmly committed to Ho Chi Minh's advice to 'vanquish the Americans and be true to the historic missions of North Vietnam.'"

The secret CIA summary also contained an ominous hint that the Pathet Lao

might call Chinese troops into Laos if the government continues to use Thai troops. At present, approximately 4,000 Thais are fighting with the Laotian Army inside Laos.

"Vanna said that on several occasions," continued the CIA report, "the NLHS (Communist front) has refused Communist Chinese proposals to 'liberate Laos' on the grounds that world tensions would probably result. However, he said continued or increased infusion of Royal Thai Army troops into Laos could result in the introduction of Chinese Army combat elements..."

"Vanna said that the RLG (Royal Lao Government) is tired of war, and the Lao people want a peace settlement, a unified Laos and an opportunity to reconstruct the country," added the CIA report.

"The Lao armed forces, however, are not expected to give up the battle easily, although FAR (government) troops are tired of fighting and PL (Pathet Lao) forces are nearly equal to FAR in strength.

## House Junket

The congressional junketeering year got off to an impressive start when 14 members of the House Ways and Means Committee, 11 of their wives and four staff members flew off to Europe on a luxurious Air Force jetliner.

The excuse for this pleasure safari was to educate the members in the workings of the European Common Market and related trade problems. In the past, the members got sufficient education from testimony, staff reports and other data less expensive for the taxpayer than a week in Paris and Brussels.

One member, Rep. James Corman, (D-Calif.) was so enthusiastic about the junketeering that he stretched his tour to include India, Australia and New Zealand, all on "committee business." Corman paid for his wife's transportation.

Other Ways and Means junketeers stretched the week-long Common Market tour to include such places as Israel, Madrid or Budapest. They were Reps. Richard Fulton (D-Tenn.); Hugh Carey (D-N.Y.); Herman Schneebeli (R-Pa.), and Barber Conable (R-N.Y.).

Those who settled for the standard week in Paris and Brussels were Reps. Phil Landrum (D-Ga.); Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.); Joe Waggonner (D-La.); Joe Karth (D-Minn.); John Byrnes (R-Wis.); Jackson Betts (R-Ohio); Jerry Pettis (R-Calif.) and Don Brotzman (R-Colo.).

Footnote: To the credit of Congressman Conable, he set an example by paying his own air fare and returning \$117 of his allotment funds to the U.S. embassy in Brussels.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

DATE 26 Jan '72 PAGE D 15

# Cables Show Doubletalk on VC

By Jack Anderson

The secret cables from Saigon show that U.S. officials have been talking out of both sides of their mouths about their campaign to wipe out the Vietcong infrastructure.

The idea was to kill, capture or convert the key people who operate the Vietcong underground inside South Vietnam. This grim missionary effort is known delicately as Operation Phoenix, named after a mythical bird which rises from its own ashes.

But the Phoenix program, according to the classified cable traffic, hasn't gotten off the ground. Ellsworth Bunker, the American Ambassador in Saigon, has reported to Secretary of State Bill Rogers that the operation "has not appeared to have significantly weakened" the Vietcong infrastructure.

Bunker's cable is dated Aug. 30, 1971. The date is significant. For a few days earlier, Ambassador William Colby and Assistant Defense Secretary G. Warren Nutter made public statements saying exactly the opposite.

Colby, who headed the pacification program in Vietnam, testified on July 19 before the House Foreign Operations subcommittee. Suave and solemn as an undertaker, he praised the Phoenix program.

It "has reduced the power of the VCI (Vietcong Infrastructure), he said, and "is an essential part of the Government of Vietnam's defense." American support, he declared, "is fully warranted."

The VCI, he said, "operates under considerable limitations" and has been reduced in some areas "to skeleton status." As statistical evidence, he reported that 9,331 VCI were "neutralized during the first five months of 1971. This included 3,650 killed, he said.

## Secret Reports

Bunker's secret Aug. 30 cable, however, tells a dismayingly different story. Although the Phoenix program "routinely exceeds its goals of neutralizations (deaths and arrests)," confided Bunker, it "has not appeared to have significantly weakened the VCI."

Giving the classified statistics on VCI strength, he reported: "June strength (of) 61,994 was down 341 from May. The drop in strength for the first half of 1971 is about 10 per cent. Even if this figure is reliable, it is not a significant decrease in view of the urgent GVN (Government of Vietnam) efforts directed against the VCI in 1971.

"Sixty thousand members of an underground organization in a population of 18 million represents one VCI for each

300 people. This has apparently been adequate to keep the VCI viable and enable them to make their presence felt."

A few weeks before Colby bragged to Congress about the success of the Phoenix program, his top aide in Gia Dinh province, David McKillop, reported grimly: "We have not scratched the surface of the Urban VCI network of the Shadow Supply System."

In a confidential report from Binh Duong province, Lt. Col. Gerald Chikalla informed Colby that Operation Phoenix "was killing off the little fish but missing the sharks."

"There has developed the tendency to place more importance on volume rather than on quality neutralizations," reported Chikalla. "Much of this can be attributed to U.S. guidance and influence and Quotas."

Another reason for Phoenix's failure was the unwillingness of the Vietnamese to turn in their sons and fathers to the Saigon government. As Lt. Col. Jack Cantrell put it in a classified report from Binh Tuy province:

"The major reasons for lack of success include: (a) The inherent distaste of the people to indict (inform on) relatives, friends or personnel with political implications. . . (Phoenix) is a U.S. innovation that has been bought officially by

the Vietnamese but which does not get the priority attention in action at any level that it gets on paper."

Similar admissions of failure came from Lt. Col. Gerald Bartlett in Hau Nghia province.

Yet Colby suppressed these unfavorable reports and gave Congress a fabricated, favorable account of the Phoenix program. He was supported by the Pentagon's G. Warren Nutter, who wrote a similarly glowing letter about Operation Phoenix to House Foreign Affairs Chairman Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) on Aug. 21.

Once again, we have caught government officials in a flagrant deception. They twisted the facts, apparently, in order to win congressional support.

## Gift from Agnew

Vice President Agnew is a man often accused of a lack of sympathy for the black and the poor. But you'd have a hard time convincing Ray May, the rugged outside linebacker of the Baltimore Colts.

May has adopted three teen-aged black youths and plans to convert his Kansas ranch into a home for disadvantaged city boys.

Not long ago, May received a handwritten note from the Vice President. "Ray, congratulations," it said. "Perhaps this will help a little." Enclosed was a crisp \$100 bill.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jan. 11, 1972

B11

# U.S. Deception on Role in Cambodia

By Jack Anderson

A secret exchange between Washington and Phnom Penh reveals that officials aren't telling the truth about the U.S. role in Cambodia.

Because of congressional hostility, the Nixon administration has pretended to take no active part in raising funds from other nations to support the tottering regime of Cambodian strongman Lon Nol.

The secret cables show, however, that the U.S. not only is bringing political pressure on other governments to contribute to Lon Nol but has actually prepared a solicitation letter for Lon Nol's signature.

Apparently, U.S. policymakers don't trust the Cambodian leader to write his own letters on such a delicate matter. The appeal was supposed to be addressed "on a personal basis" to other heads of state who might have a little cash to spare for Cambodian aid.

Congressmen have balked at financing Lon Nol because of the dismaying similarity between his regime and some of the corrupt, floundering South Vietnamese regimes that have cost the American taxpayers a fortune.

In an earlier column, we quoted from secret dispatches that described Lon Nol as "a sick man, both physically and mentally" and told of wide-

spread incompetence and corruption throughout his government.

## Compulsive Womanizer

Even some of the able men under him were characterized respectively, as "an inveterate gambler," "a compulsive womanizer" and as a leader whose "personal authority is diluted by a tendency toward financial corruption."

American Ambassador Emory Swank, in one secret report, criticized "Lon Nol's haphazard, out-of-channel and ill-coordinated conduct of military operations." The result is that Communist hit-and-run harassing operations have developed—apparently much to the Viet Cong's surprise—into a serious military treat to the Cambodian capital.

Similar reports about some of South Vietnam's earlier political corruption and military bungling were kept secret from the American people. If the truth had been known in time, the U.S. might have been spared some of the lives and resources that have gone down the drain in Vietnam.

Because of the Vietnam experience, Congress is keeping a tight pursestring on Cambodian aid. The Nixon administration has gone behind congressional backs, however, to sneak military supplies into Cambodia through South Vietnam and Indonesia.

Now the administration has resorted to deception again to

raise exchange support funds for Cambodia.

Cambodia "has undertaken to do its own representations to elicit donors for the ESF," a State Department spokesman told us blandly.

## Secret Instructions

But secret instructions were cabled to the American Embassy in Phnom Penh, declaring: "We believe political approach necessary lest finance ministries, who are generally opposed new aid programs, arrange for an evasive or negative reaction to (the Cambodian) appeal.

"Department believes high-level political appeal needed to improve chances for success. Letter from Lon Nol to heads of prospective donor governments could help nail down (contributions)."

The suggested letter begins: "Excellency: I am writing this note on a personal basis in order to bring to your Excellency's attention directly the economic problem that we are now confronted with in the Khmer Republic..."

It winds up: "I am asking that your government make a contribution of — to the fund for 1972 at a meeting to be held in Phnom Penh (on January 14.)"

All Lon Nol had to do was fill in the blank space with the correct amount for each country. The sums that will be sought are: U.S., \$12.5 million; Japan, \$7.5 million; Australia,

\$3 million; Britain, \$500,000; New Zealand, \$300,000; Indonesia, \$250,000; Malaysia, \$250,000; Singapore, \$250,000; Thailand, \$250,000; and the Philippines, \$250,000.

Despite the State Department's public pretense that Lon Nol is running his own fund-raising drive, here's what the secret instructions add:

"Once letters sent, we prepared urge our embassies in key countries make high-level approaches in support of Lon Nol request. We understand that Japanese will then move out and actively lobby for participation in ESF. We can, on selective basis, do some lobbying here, especially with UK and Australia."

These secret instructions, like the India-Pakistan revelations, demonstrate, sadly, that the government of, by and for the people cannot always be trusted to tell the people the truth.

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**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 10, 1972 D 11

# Bay of Bengal and Tonkin Gulf

By Jack Anderson

The secret White House Papers reveal some ominous similarities between the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Tonkin.

The Gulf of Tonkin incident on Aug. 4, 1964, led to our deep involvement in the Vietnam war. The American public was told that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had staged an unprovoked attack upon a U.S. destroyer, although later evidence indicated that the attack was actually provoked.

The risk of a similar naval incident in the Bay of Bengal caused grave apprehensions inside the State Department as a U.S. task force steamed toward a Soviet task force at the height of the Indian-Pakistani fighting.

On Dec. 7, a top secret warning was flashed to Washington that "three Soviet naval ships, a seagoing minesweeper and a tanker have begun to move northeastward into the Bay of Bengal. The units entered the Indian Ocean from the Malacca Strait on 3 December and were located approximately 500 nautical miles east of Ceylon on 7 December."

Urgent huddles in the White House led to a decision on Dec. 10 to assemble in Malacca Strait a U.S. task force, spearheaded by the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the Navy's most powerful ship. The primary purpose was to make a "show of force" and to divert

Indian planes and ships from Pakistan.

As the task force moved into position, Admiral John McCain, our Pacific commander, inquired on Dec. 11 about "the feasibility of . . . aerial surveillance of Soviet task group located approximately 180 NM (nautical miles) southwest of Ceylon."

## Air Surveillance

Authorization was flashed back the same day "in the event Task Force 74 is directed to transmit the Strait of Malacca. At that time, appropriate screening-surveillance flights are authorized."

As the American warships moved through the strait and headed into the Bay of Bengal, even more ominous reports reached Washington from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

"Recent indicators have been received which suggest the PRC (Peoples Republic of China) may be planning actions regarding the Indo-Pakistan conflict," a top secret message reported tersely. "According to a reliable clandestine source, (Pakistan's) President Yahya Khan claimed . . . today that the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad had assured him that within 72 hours the Chinese Army will move towards the border."

"President Yahya's claim cannot be confirmed. However, recent Peking propaganda statements have become more critical of India's involvement in East Pakistan."

From Katmandu in the Himalayas, meanwhile, came

word that both the Soviet and Indian military attaches had asked Col. Melvin Holst, the American attache, what he knew about Chinese troop movements and U.S. fleet movements.

"U.S.S.R. Attache Loginov," said the secret dispatch, "called upon PRC military attache Chao Kuang Chih in Katmandu advising Chao that PRC should not get too serious about intervention, because U.S.S.R. would react, had many missiles, etc."

Holst concluded, the dispatch added, that "both the U.S.S.R. and India Embassies have a growing concern that PRC might intervene."

Simultaneously, the Central Intelligence Agency rushed out a top secret report that "the Chinese have been passing weather data for locations in Tibet and along the Sino-Indian border since 6 December.

The continued passing of weather data for these locations is considered unusual and may indicate some form of alert posture."

## Soviet Threat

And from New Delhi, the CIA reported: "According to a reliable clandestine source, Prime Minister Gandhi told a leader of her Congress Party that she had some indications that the Chinese intend to intervene along India's northern border. . . . Mrs. Gandhi said that the Chinese action might be in the Ladakh area."

Russia's Ambassador to India Nikolai M. Pegov, however, promised on Dec. 13 that

the Soviets "would open a diversionary action" against the Chinese and "will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene."

Here are the highlights of this ominous Soviet pledge, which the CIA claimed to have picked up from a "reliable source."

"Pegov stated that Pakistan is trying to draw both the United States and China into the present conflict. The Soviet Union, however, does not believe that either country will intervene."

"According to Pegov, the movement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is an effort by the United States to bully India, to discourage it from striking against West Pakistan, and at the same time to boost the morale of the Pakistani forces. Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene."

"If China should decide to intervene in Ladakh, said Pegov, the Soviet Union would open a diversionary action in Sinkiang. Pegov also commented that after Dacca is liberated and the Bangladesh government is installed, both the United States and China will be unable to act and will change their current attitude toward the crisis."

This is how the big powers danced precariously on the edge of the brink just before Christmas as people sang about peace on earth and good will toward men.

Bell-McClure Syndicate





Jack Anderson

## Telling Truth Is Best Policy

THE GOVERNMENT could easily have avoided the grief caused by publication of the secret White House papers on India and Pakistan merely by doing one thing—telling the truth.

If presidential adviser Henry Kissinger had not lied to the press in his December background briefing on the Asia war, there would have been no story for us to write. The documents would simply have confirmed what the public had already been told.

Instead, the White House chose to mislead the public flagrantly. Kissinger said the administration was not anti-India, a misrepresentation that must have been obvious to both India, Pakistan and the allies of both.

The secret papers prove that the administration was militantly anti-India. It was this contradiction, not the fact that the papers were classified, that made them news.

Indeed, it is doubtful that the various sources who made the papers available would have done so if the administration had not engaged in such bald-faced deception.

Now, unfortunately, the administration seems bent on widening its credibility gap. It is thundering off in search of our sources instead of making good the solemn promise it made during the court battle over the Pentagon Papers.

At that time, the government admitted there was "massive over-classification" of official documents. It promised to reform the classification system, which it had undermined by chronic overuse of the "secret" stamp.

Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart summarized the state of affairs in one sentence: "When everything is classified," he wrote, "nothing is classified."

Today, documents which might genuinely need to be kept temporarily from public view are lost in a classified shuffle of miscellaneous cables, correspondence, intelligence summaries and other bric-a-brac.

Government officials almost daily demonstrate their contempt for the security labels by slipping newsmen selected secret papers which make them look good.

If these labels had any real meaning, the government itself would be the nation's number one security risk.

But while high officials have debased and cheapened the "secret" stamps, they still find them useful for one purpose: to keep their actions and particularly their blunders hidden from public view.

But this passion for secrecy is far more serious than mere bureaucratic bungling. Secrecy, as the Supreme Court has observed, is not merely undemocratic, it is anti-democratic.

The proper function of our political system depends on the ability of the public to be informed. This is the crucial mission of the First Amendment — to promote a maximum flow of news and commentary to every citizen.

There is no way this fundamental concept, so basic to democracy, can be squared with a system of "security" classification which is, in reality, a legalized form of censorship.

The White House papers on India and Pakistan contain not a shred of information that threatens the nation's security. Instead, they reveal the inside policy maneuverings and public deceptions of our top officials.

They tell the story of foreign policy moves that may have pushed India—the world's second largest nation and its largest democracy—into the arms of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we find ourselves locked in an embrace with a feeble, beaten military dictatorship.

Putting the secret stamp on such information has nothing to do with national security. Rather, it has to do with political security.

### Nassikas' Giveaway

WE EXPOSED in a series of columns last June how Federal Power Commission chairman John Nassikas lied to Congress, sold out the public in a \$4 billion rate case and suppressed his own economist's opposition to the giveaway.

Our charges were investigated by Rep. Neal Smith (D-Iowa), who summoned Nassikas and others to testify before his House Special Small Business Subcommittee. Now Smith has completed his formal report. In many respects, it is tougher than our columns.

"It is the view of this subcommittee," declares the report, "that the public has lost confidence in the ability of the FPC to set just and reasonable producer rates for the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce . . .

"The subcommittee believes that the action taken by the FPC in creating higher rates for gas produced in the southern Louisiana area was not in the public interest."

We had estimated this rate increase would cost America's consumers \$4 billion. Smith's subcommittee estimated the sell-out closer to \$4.5 billion.

Bell-McClure Syndicate



## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, Jan. 7, 1972

C23

# Nixon's One Man State Department

By Jack Anderson

Owlsh, offish Henry Kissinger, the foreign policy wizard, is simply over his head in paperwork.

He is trying to serve President Nixon as a one-man State Department. But the paperwork is too voluminous, the problems too overwhelming even for the brilliant Kissinger to master.

Still he tries to manage every foreign crisis, to absorb every new detail, to advise the President on every development. During the three hectic weeks before Christmas, the secret White House Papers show Kissinger had his fingers in the following pies:

- He directed the top-level strategy sessions on the Indian-Pakistani conflict. He submitted the option papers, for example, that persuaded President Nixon to dispatch a naval task force into the Bay of Bengal.

- Kissinger compiled a grim situation report showing a dangerous intensification of North Vietnamese military pressure in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Not only were our Laotian allies in possible peril, but the government we support in Cambodia appeared to be in danger of collapse. He recommended air strikes against North Vietnam.

- He orchestrated the delicate U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Under his direction,

Ambassador George Bush probed and pressed in the backrooms of the United Nations for a diplomatic solution while Egypt and Syria deployed their forces for a military showdown. To keep a military balance, Kissinger urged the shipment of Phantom jets to Israel.

### Calling Kissinger

- He became deeply involved in preparing the new international monetary agreement. President Nixon's unilateral economic moves last August caused a diplomatic backfire around the world. He did not consult with America's trading partners. He offered no explanation to the International Monetary Fund. He ignored the diplomatic niceties. In all this, he was advised chiefly by Treasury Secretary John Connally. Kissinger was called in, finally to unravel the international disorder.

- He stage-managed the President's blobe-trotting to placate ruffled allied leaders. Not only were the briefing papers prepared under Kissinger's supervision, but he traveled with the President. Kissinger seemed to be everywhere—conferring with British Prime Minister Edward Heath, breakfasting with French President Georges Pompidou and, after hours, hitting the night spots with beautiful young ladies.

- All the while Kissinger

continued to prepare for the presidential pilgrimages to Peking and Moscow. He not only handled the arrangements but plotted the big-power chess that the President will play with our two chief adversaries.

- More than anyone else, Kissinger served as ring master for the three-ring Paris peace talks, Vienna SALT and Brussels NATO conference that were going on simultaneously behind closed doors. He called the signals from the White House.

He also kept close watch through horn-rimmed glasses upon such far-flung trouble spots as Cuba, Chile and Korea. He monitored the diplomatic cables, intelligence digests and situation reports that poured into Washington from around the globe. His interpretations and recommendations, largely, guided the President in setting policy everywhere.

### Paper Clip War

Day after day, Kissinger processed dozens of option papers, security memoranda and briefing papers for the President. Kissinger also worked on several major national security studies on such subjects as "Prisoners of War" and "Laos Peace Initiatives."

In short, Henry Kissinger has been running U.S. foreign policy out of his basement of-

fice in the White House. The final decisions, to be sure, have been made by the President. But Kissinger has guided the President's thinking and directed the implementation of his policies.

The State Department, with its worldwide foreign service network, has been relegated largely to a messenger service. Kissinger accepts briefing papers from the State Department, and the department's specialists participate in White House strategy sessions.

But the final formulation of policy is handled by Kissinger. In preparation for the President's Peking visit, for example, veteran strategists at the State Department submitted briefing papers but weren't invited to join the advance party now in Peking. This mission is completely controlled by Kissinger.

Yet Kissinger has been able to operate in almost total secrecy. Congress has sought in vain to find out what he's doing, but he has refused to testify as Secretary of State. Bill Rogers is required to do. The State Department, which is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, can't even keep up with Kissinger.

Not until we got hold of the White House Papers has the public been given a glimpse into Kissinger's secret operations.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Jan. 6, 1972 D11

# Sato Steering Away From the U.S.

By Jack Anderson

Japan's staunchly pro-American Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, severely shaken by a series of diplomatic shocks from the White House, is steering a new course away from the U.S. and closer to Communist China.

Secret White House documents caution that, ultimately, Japan may slip out from behind the American nuclear shield and become a nuclear power in her own right.

In the meantime, Sato wants to make his own deal with the Chinese, not let President Nixon trade off Japanese defenselessness for Chinese concessions at the bargaining table in Peking next month.

The Japanese fear Mr. Nixon may offer to keep Japan unarmed. He may try to persuade Chou En-lai that the Japanese-American security treaty deters Japan from "going it alone" and rebuilding her military might.

"It would be . . . a mistake, the Japanese have warned, for the President to make such an argument. His doing so would inevitably become known in Japan, thus deepening Japanese distrust of U.S."

This warning is contained in the secret papers prepared for President Nixon's crucial meeting today with Prime Minister Sato in San Clemente, Calif. We have seen

some of these documents, which also show:

## Losing Japan?

- The President has pulled the pro-American rug right out from under Sato. First, Mr. Nixon made overtures to Peking behind Sato's back, then twisted his arm to get a textile agreement, then slapped him in the face with harsh economic measures.

- This has turned Sato away from the U.S. and has cost America the confidence of the Japanese "establishment." Reports American Ambassador Armin Meyer in a secret message from Tokyo: "Whereas heretofore anti-Americanism was pretty much special vehicle for opposition parties and Japan's tendentious press, developments of past few months have fostered seeds of doubt within normally American-oriented community."

The same message, labeled "President Sato talks," says the Japanese have the "impression that Japan is being asked to maintain cold-war confrontation posture while President's mission to Peking gives USG (U.S. Government) advantage of appearing to be more progressive and peace-minded."

- On the eve of the Nixon-Sato summit meeting, Meyer was visited by a distinguished scholar of Japanese-American affairs, Kei Wakaizumi, whom the Ambassador identified as a "confidant" of top Japanese

leaders. Wakaizumi suggested that a joint communique be issued after the San Clemente meeting proposing a "restudy" of postwar relationships in Asia. "Such a restudy," Wakaizumi said, "would permit GOJ (Government of Japan) latitude similar to that which USG is enjoying in political dealing with Peking."

- The same message, lauds this assessment of future Japanese policy: Japan "(A) will agree that (Peking) is sole legitimate government of China; (B) will recognize that Taiwan is part of China; (C) will avoid any 'two China' implications; and (D) will rule out concept of an 'independent Taiwan' or a U.N. trusteeship over Taiwan."

## New Attitudes

Earlier, Kazuyuki Kasuga, a political power in Japan, paid quiet calls on top Washington officials and gave them a preview of the new Japanese attitudes.

The President has carefully studied the secret minutes, for example, of Kasuga's meeting with Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard. Speaking for Japan's Democratic Socialist Party, Kasuga suggested that the Japanese-American security treaty requires "some review."

Packard asked Kasuga, according to the secret minutes, "in what respects treaty should be modified and if it should be discontinued. Mr.

Kasuga replied that DSP believes U.S.-Japan security system would remain viable without U.S. forces or bases in Japan . . .

"Packard replied that if GOJ should come to feel Japan did not need our protection and wished to assume total responsibility for Japan's security, including defense against the nuclear threat, we should have no forces in Japan. But then, Mr. Packard asked, 'Would we need treaty?'"

"Mr. Kasuga replied that treaty would provide effective deterrent against (China's) potential nuclear power and that DSP desires to maintain basic security system . . . Consistent stationing of U.S. forces in Japan is unnecessary, said Mr. Kasuga, and he recalled Japanese proverb, 'Too much is as bad as falling short.'"

"Mr. Packard said if GOJ decided should be no U.S. troops or bases in Japan, 'That's your business; we respect your sovereignty.'"

"Mr. Packard said U.S. troops are in Japan for security of Japan, not that of U.S., and that, if we had no forces or bases in Japan, would be well to look at consequences of that fact . . . A sudden precipitous change would have serious implications and repercussions throughout Asia. We must move slowly and not jump to new position."

Bell-McClure Syndicate



**Joseph Kraft**

# Undermining Kissinger

HIGH POLICY differences are widely supposed to have prompted the leak of secret documents on the Indo-Pakistani crisis to Jack Anderson. But most of the evidence suggests that the true cause is a vulgar bureaucratic row aimed at getting the President's chief assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger.

The most striking evidence is like the evidence of the dog that didn't bark in the Sherlock Holmes story. The fact is that no enduring policy issue of high importance is involved in the leaks.

The fight over East Bengal is largely a one-shot affair. Hardly anything that happens on the subcontinent is central to international politics. The United States had already tipped toward Pakistan — and practically everybody knew it—when the leaks were sprung. At the time, as some of Dr. Kissinger's comments make plain, the administration was anticipating a return to more normal relations with New Delhi.

A SECOND BIT of evidence involves Mr. Anderson himself. He is not deeply versed in foreign affairs. No one who aimed to change a line of international policy would single out Mr. Anderson as the agent for deflecting that result through the leak of secret information.

Mr. Anderson's specialty—and it is an important specialty—is putting the journalistic arm on wrong-doers.

By no mere accident the chief fruit of his disclosures was not something that affected policy. The chief consequence was to impugn the integrity of Dr. Kissinger.

As a third bit of evidence there is the state of relations among senior officials and principal agencies of the foreign affairs community in the Nixon administration. Washington veterans tell me that to find a fit counterpart they have to go back to 1950, and the deadly you-or-me rivalry between Dean Acheson who was then at the State Department, and Louis Johnson, who then ruled the roost at the Pentagon. In any case, relations nowadays are marked by paranoia, jealousy and hatred.

The chief target for most of the venom is Dr. Kissinger, and some of the fault is

his. He has a sharp tongue, and he has been unnecessarily unkind in comments about some of the senior officials of the most prestigious departments.

But most of the resentment has been caused by what Dr. Kissinger does in the service of the President. The present administration has expanded the job of special assistant for national security affairs way beyond what it was under Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy. Dr. Kissinger has virtually eliminated from the decision-making business some of the most high-powered men and agencies in town.

The office of Secretary of Defense is perhaps the chief victim. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is going to be stepping down soon with practically nothing to his credit. Even his claim (which has at least some foundation) to be the author of the policy for getting out of Vietnam is not widely believed.

He seems hostile to the administration's policy on an arms control agreement, and he was completely cut out of plans for the President's visit to China. His general reputation for trickiness has caused the cognoscenti, rightly or wrongly, to establish him as the short-odds favorite for almost all leaks regarding national security these days. Indeed, some White House officials at first believed Mr. Laird leaked the Pentagon papers.

THE UNIFORMED MILITARY comes a close second in the odds. Many of them do not like the way the White House is winding down the war in Vietnam. Almost all are opposed to the arms control agreement which the White House is now negotiating with the Russians. Some are hostile to the Okinawa reversion agreement which the White House has negotiated with Japan. And far, far more than civilians in the government, the uniformed military are in the habit of leaking classified information to serve their own interests.

Not that the State Department or other civilian agencies can be entirely exempted from suspicion. Except as regards the Near East, Dr. Kissinger has taken over the whole realm of foreign policy—including even negotiation with foreign officials. This assumption of the State Department's traditional role is bitterly resented by many of the department's leading officials. Indeed, one of them, not long ago, voiced the suspicion that Dr. Kissinger spent an extra day on his last trip to China in order to embarrass the State Department which was handling the United Nations vote on Chinese admission.

With suspicions at that level, there is every reason to figure bureaucratic rivalry as the key element in the background of the Anderson papers. There is no case for lionizing, or even protecting the sources of the of the leaks.

On the contrary, for once there is a case for a presidential crackdown. Mr. Nixon's interest—and that of the country—is to find the source of the leaks and fire them fast.

Publishers-Hall Syndicate



**Tom Braden**

# Net Effect of the Anderson Leaks

IT IS already fashionable to say that the secret and private papers leaked to columnist Jack Anderson told us nothing we did not already know. In fact, they remind us of important truths we have insufficiently learned.

The first of these is that President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger are embarked upon a major change in United States foreign policy. What the American people had presumed was a polite how-do-you-do to China turns out to be a firm understanding.

The Anderson papers strongly suggest that part of this understanding was to back Pakistan against India. The papers have so far not revealed two additional pieces of evidence which buttress this view.

LAST OCTOBER 12, U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Keating called upon Indian Premier Gandhi with the warning that if India did not cease aid to dissidents in East Pakistan, Pakistan would attack from the West.

Somewhat taken aback by receiving this word from a friendly power, Madam Gandhi inquired what, in the event of such an attack would be the attitude of the United States. Keating replied that he had fulfilled his instructions and was empowered to say nothing more.

Kissinger also took a hand in attempting to frighten the Indians. He told the Indian ambassador here that if India became involved in war with both Pakistan and China, the United States could be of no assistance. The implication that Mr. Nixon's chief foreign policy aide was delivering a message from the Chinese seemed clear, and it hastened Madam Gandhi's determination to formal alliance with Moscow.

The second truth which emerges from the Anderson papers is that somebody in the United States government—and at a high level—is opposed to the New China policy and is not averse to destroying Kissinger in the process of opposing the pol-

icy. If Kissinger's influence is weakened as a result of the leak, it will be the nation's loss.

The President's assistant has been a brilliant, as well as an efficient public servant. In three years he has managed to turn the foreign policy making of the nation from obsession with ideology to judgment of power. If, in the course of this turn-around, options have not always been made clear, the fault lies not with Kissinger but with Mr. Nixon's determination that the cold war ideology still required lip service.

IT MAY BE ARGUED whether the new China policy required quite the brusqueness which the United States displayed towards its oldest friend in the East, but the Anderson papers seem to show Kissinger as a somewhat reluctant follower of the hard line. "The President is blaming me" and "He wants to tilt towards Pakistan" are not the remarks of a man with sole responsibility for each

step in an agreed course. Indeed, they seem slightly plaintive, and have set Indian representatives here in Washington to wondering what they have done to arouse Mr. Nixon's personal pique.

Finally, the Anderson papers are a reminder that public exposure of private conversations among government officials can be almost as destructive of government as the reporting of actual life and death military secrets.

Minutes of high level meetings may never be as frank again, and those who attend high level meetings may wonder whether they should say what they think or say what their enemies in the room might approve.

To reduce men to such a choice makes a mockery of government. Nobody will argue against the public's right to know the logic behind its foreign policy. But the difference between reporting the making of foreign policy and reporting private conversations is the difference between the reporter and the spy.

Los Angeles Times

**JAMES J. KILPATRICK**

## **Leak of Papers to Anderson a Grave Breach**

We are in the midst of another of those great ruffled flaps involving the press, the government, and the ethics of public and private conduct. This one is serious.

The story goes back to the first week in December, when the Washington Special Action Group met at the White House to discuss the suddenly flaming war launched by India against East Pakistan. The WSAG, in effect, is the super-National Security Council of this administration — a top-level coordinating body intended to serve the President with the best advice and intelligence that can be pulled together by skilled and experienced men.

The three WSAG meetings of Dec. 3, 4 and 6 were held in confidence, of course, behind locked doors, but written minutes were prepared. These minutes were stamped "secret-sensitive," which is the classification level just below "top secret," and then were distributed among an estimated 50 to 75 persons in the Pentagon, State Department, CIA, and the White House.

A person or persons un-

known made copies of the memoranda and gave them to columnist Jack Anderson. He excerpted them for use in his column, and a few days later supplied the texts for use by newspapers generally. In one view—it is the view of anti-Nixon liberals—Anderson performed a great public service, and his anonymous informant was a man of noble character who risked his job in the name of truth and honesty in government.

There is another view. The importance of this disquieting affair does not lie in the memoranda themselves. The importance lies in the leak. Make no mistake: This leak must be found, and it must be stopped. This is a breach of trust, and a breach of security, of the most profound implications.

The memoranda are embarrassing, no more. For the most part, the minutes reflect the discussion of men trying to find out what is going on, and seeking to decide what best to

do about it. The President, they are advised, is angry at India for its aggressive action; he wants "a tilt toward Pakistan." There is much talk of the futility of the United Nations. One detects sympathy for the plight of the emerging nation of Bangladesh; it promises to become "an international basket case." The conferees come to no particular decisions. They agree to prepare certain papers for the President. Their discussion is candid, spontaneous, unreserved.

Subsequent to these private meetings, the White House was publicly to assert its neutrality in the India-Pakistan war. Obviously the White House was not neutral. This was self-evident to every editor and critic in the country.

It is a fair surmise that every government in history has taken public positions inconsistent with its private wishes. Diplomats know this.

What matters, to repeat, is the leak itself. This is not to

be compared with the action of the Washington Post last month in blowing Henry Kissinger's cover as the source of a recent backgrounder; that was no more than an ill-mannered breach of professional rules. Neither is it to be compared with Daniel Ellsberg's clandestine distribution last spring of the aging "Pentagon Papers." Ellsberg was then out of the government.

We must infer, in this instance, that someone still employed at the very highest levels of confidence—some one holding top secret clearance, with access to other memoranda of immense importance — has wantonly violated the trust reposed in him. This goes beyond disloyalty; it sails close to the windward edge of treason. What other documents one must wonder, has this person secretly copied? Where will he peddle them next? This is the alarming aspect. Anderson thinks it "funny," but then Anderson would. It is not funny at all.



Joseph Kraft

# The Anderson Papers

JACK ANDERSON achieved a journalistic coup in publishing the minutes of the secret White House meetings on the India-Pakistan crisis. But how much of a hero is the man who leaked the information?

My strong impression is that he accomplished very little public good, if any. On the contrary, his actions are almost certain to drive the Nixon administration deeper than ever into secret dealings on a restricted basis.

On the good side of the ledger, the leak has now provided unmistakable information that the President deliberately tilted American policy in favor of Pakistan and against India. But that much was known to everybody in touch with the State Department and White House at the time of the crisis.

Sens. Edmund Muskie, Edward Kennedy and Frank Church, among others, said so. Hundreds of us wrote it. Indeed, one reason Henry Kissinger held his background briefing of Dec. 7 was to take the edge off the charges the White House was biased in favor of Pakistan.

A second and more important gain from the revelation has to do with information about the way the government works. The secret minutes provide detailed, irrefutable evidence that day-to-day foreign policy is made in the White House as never before.

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Set against these gains, there is the way the administration is apt to react. Maybe the President and Dr. Kissinger are going to say to themselves: "Golly, we sure erred in not telling the truth and nothing but the truth. Jack Anderson has taught us that honesty is the best policy."

But much more likely, they are going to feel that the minutes of the meeting were legitimately classified internal working papers of the government. Probably they are going to feel that the stuff was leaked not for any large purpose, but out of opposition to the policy. And almost certainly—and I say this as an opponent of the policy—they will be right in this surmise.

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suspicion that the departments and agencies are full of crypto-Democrats out to get the administration—is only going to be intensified. And that deep suspicion is going to yield two sets of adverse reactions.

For one thing, security will be tightened. There is apt to be an end to the kind of minutes that were taken at Dr. Kissinger's meetings. They will certainly not be spread through the bureaucracy anymore.

Secondly, the limited access which experienced officials now have to White House decision-making is going to be even further curbed. The President and Dr. Kissinger are going to keep things to themselves more than ever. Important decisions which are even now made with too little consultation—and with too small an input from the outside—are going to be made by an even more narrowly circumscribed group of men.

No doubt Anderson gets high marks for his acumen and industry and courage as a journalist. But his source, the man who leaked the stuff, is something else. Whatever his motives, he has done this country a disservice.

1 2 JAN 1972

## WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

# Things Ordinary People Call Lies

By FRANK GETLEIN

Jack Anderson's remarkable service to the country in revealing the White House discussions that led to our forthright pro-dictatorship, anti-democracy, pro-slaughter, anti-victim position in the India-Pakistan war extended well beyond the mere making public of the processes of such decisions for the advancement of freedom in the world.

★

His revelations clearly showed what ordinary people would ordinarily think of as a policy of deliberately lying to the public. Selected Washington pundits have, with little trouble been able to convince themselves that no deception was intended because anyone who was anyone in town already knew that we would support Pakistan — "tilt in favor of" seems to have been the Kissingerian formula—and oppose India.

But those Americans who weren't someone in Washington, or approximately 99.99999 percent of the people, are still more or less inclined to believe what their government tells them. Lacking prior access to the higher truth behind the public statement, when the contradictions are pointed out, they are inclined to think that somebody lied.

When, as seems entirely possible, Dr. Kissinger does not receive an especially warm welcome back to the highest levels of the academic community, the Anderson papers should be remembered.

The same thing happened to Lyndon Johnson's Kissinger, Walt Rostow, who was forced to go and teach in Texas, where, presumably, the academic world takes a less punctilious view of these things.

At the same time, it seemed

to many—and indeed was publicly interpreted by many—as academic partisanship against Rostow because of his part in escalating the Indochinese war. The academics didn't like the war, it was said, and expressed their dislike by turning their backs on their former colleague.

There may have been something in that. Academics do tend to be more solidly against the war than any other wage-earning part of the population.

But a stronger factor in Rostow's rejection almost certainly was the free and easy way with truth he necessarily picked up in the White House. A vital part of the whole escalation was the deliberate deception of the public and the Congress at every step of the way, from that early light at the end of the tunnel to the events in Tonkin Gulf to the glorious victory of the Tet offensive.

Rostow was inescapably involved in the continuing deceptions. But the whole point, the basic assumption, of scholarships is that the scholar searches for truth wherever the search may lead. Truth, for a scholar, is an end in itself and not a walnut shell to be manipulated on a table to dazzle the yokels.

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If Kissinger indeed is not carried on the shoulders of his fellow academics on his retirement from government, the cause will be, not the positions he took, but the double positions as revealed by Anderson, the things that ordinary people ordinarily call lies.

The process seems to be getting habitual and it may have elements of personal tragedy for scholars who serve their governments by putting aside

the normal scruples of scholarship.

It may be seen on the level of farce in the continuing evolution of the political thought of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., another academic who bounded into government with great enthusiasm. A convincing advocate of presidential power when he was working for a President, Schlesinger's scholarly analysis has now led him to think that presidential power is not all that unrestrained a blessing and must be curbed in some way.

There are those cynical enough to believe that Schlesinger's views of presidential power thus vary directly with the likelihood of Schlesinger's finding appropriate employment with any given president.

A relatively minor form of similar self-deception occurs in the Anderson papers in the discussion on continuing economic aid to Pakistan while cutting it off to India.

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While the game planners were thus constructing a heavy tilt in the attitude which they would nevertheless call in public "evenhanded," Maurice Williams of AID called their attention to the fact that the price of vegetable oil was weakening in the United States. Cutting it off from shipment to India would weaken it further. He therefore requested that commodity be shipped in place of wheat.

This confusion of motive is the inevitable result of the double-entry style of decision-making as revealed by Anderson. The pragmatic reason for scholars to adhere to truth is that it lets them know where they are. The principle may have application to government.

# 'Leaks Follow the Course of Greatest Impact'

WASHINGTON—The choicest bits of the White House's secret strategy sessions on the Pakistan-India fuss had already been published in Jack Anderson's syndicated column—read by an estimated 45 million muck-hungry Americans—when Presidential aide Henry Kissinger decided that the best way to fight back was to say that his statements had suffered distortion by being printed out of context.

That was a mistake. Last week Mr. Anderson responded to Mr. Kissinger's criticism by releasing to the press the full text of the White House minutes, and these were printed by The New York Times, The Washington Post and other major newspapers across the country.

It was no great act of largesse. Mr. Anderson could spare a few secret documents; he says he gets dozens of them every week "from officials of integrity who believe Uncle Sam can tell the truth and survive." A smaller selection, he says, comes "from people who are out to get even with their boss or somebody else." The officials who slipped him these White House papers might qualify in both categories. Mr. Kissinger, having upstaged the entire State Department and some of the Defense Department, is not without bureaucratic enemies.

Those who recall Mr. Anderson's being caught in 1954 eavesdropping on Bernard Goldfine in the Sheraton-Carlton Hotel, or sending an assistant to dig through J. Edgar Hoover's garage can last year, would have been easily persuaded that Mr. Anderson got the documents by some light-fin-

gered technique. But Mr. Anderson says they came the usual way—"from friends in sensitive government positions." The friends were "appalled by the Administration's siding with the Pakistani dictatorship" and by the "misleading information coming out of the White House."

Sensing an opening, Mr. Anderson softened them up further by implanting the fear—which he shared—that the presence of the United States fleet in the Bay of Bengal might be pointing to another Gulf of Tonkin incident.

If the Johnson Administration's secret plans in 1964 for covert war against North Vietnam—and for subsequent bombing of the North—had been known in advance of the Tonkin episode, the escalation of the war might have been prevented. Right?

And if the public knew what the White House was thinking about India and Pakistan, it might even mean preventing a conflict with Russia. Right?

"Quite frankly," says Mr. Anderson, "this was persuasive with my friends. Originally they gave me about a dozen documents. They said these were the key ones. But I didn't feel I should write without seeing all the documents of this period. I told my sources, 'I trust you guys, and when you say this is a representative sampling I'm sure you're telling the truth. But somebody might argue that you had misled me by picking out just the documents that prove what you want to prove. I think I've got to see them all.'"

"They said, 'You're crazy,' I said,

"No. You've got to decide whether you work for the country or for Kissinger.' So they gave me all of them."

In dealing with people so disposed, Mr. Anderson benefits from the first law of leak physics: Leaks tend to follow the course of greatest impact. Officials with a secret tale to tattle know that through Mr. Anderson's column they will reach 700 newspapers, which is by far the most widespread circulation of any political column in American journalism.

Not that all 700 newspapers always use it. Some editors don't appreciate what Mr. Anderson does to some of their heroes. Others are occasionally afraid he may be leading them down the libel path. His column about the sex problems encountered by cartoonist Al Capp on college campuses, for instance, was carried in only two newspapers on the East Coast.

When Mr. Anderson inherited the Merry-Go-Round column from Drew Pearson in 1969 there were some doubts about his ability to handle it. True, he had helped produce the column since 1947, and Mr. Pearson had contributed little during his last years (the series that ruined the career of the late Senator Thomas Dodd, for example, was almost entirely Mr. Anderson's handiwork). Nevertheless, during most of his career Mr. Anderson—an unglamorous teetotaling Mormon family man (nine children)—was overshadowed by his suave boss and partner, who handled the big-name contacts in Georgetown salons.

Mr. Anderson, now 49, is not a

party goer. He takes his religion very seriously and teaches Sunday school.

Big physically (about six feet, 200 pounds), a onetime halfback and brash, Mr. Anderson likes to cultivate the reputation of a Peck's Bad Boy, an outsider. He has a Middle American background: an upbringing in Utah, no college degree, experience on Utah newspapers and the Stars and Stripes before reaching Washington. He has never received an important journalism prize. He likes to take jibes at the "Establishment press," though his column, in the sense that it is a key conduit to some portions of the Establishment, is also very much a part of it.

If, after all this, there were any lingering doubts about Mr. Anderson as proprietor of the Merry-Go-Round column, they must surely have been dispelled by the White House papers coup. Now, with a staff of four legmen (Les Whitten, Brit Hume, Joe Spear, Ray Cole) operating out of five rooms in Howard Hughes's old office suite on K Street, Mr. Anderson is biting hard enough to be forgiven what appears to be an extra layer to his customary cockiness. He's even challenging the White House to get tough about his latest gambit.

"I didn't get my information out of a Daniel Ellsberg, who belonged to another Administration and has been out of government two years," he says. "I got my information from some of Nixon's own boys."

—ROBERT SHERRILL

Mr. Sherrill is a freelance writer based in Washington.





*Stephen Klaidman*

# Uninformed Officials

THE PUBLIC often feels cheated because of a gnawing feeling that the press is not providing enough information about the decision-making process in government. Newsmen frequently share that feeling.

That is one of the reasons that documents such as the Pentagon papers and the recently published Anderson papers, released through dedicated columnist Jack Anderson, are read so avidly. They give an insight into the way decisions are reached.

They show presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger's

school-masterly control of the high-level policymaking body known as the Washington Special Action Group. They also show fumbling and uncertainty in an area where policy should have been well thought out months before.

Perhaps most disturbing, however, the documents indicate that the top officials charged with setting a course for the United States in matters of war and peace are operating with less than adequate information to make decisions on a well-informed and thoughtful basis.

Conceivably, that information is available at lower levels and has failed to reach the top because of the denseness of the bureaucracy. Whatever the reason, however, it appears that it is not always in evidence among those who most need it.

It would seem, however, that any dedicated newspaper reader was about as well informed as the White House on what was happening on the battlefields during the recent Indo-Pakistani war.

The evidence is contained in the documents on the war released by Anderson. They consist of summaries and quoted matter from three meetings of the Washington Special Action Group held during the fighting.

DURING these meetings, three men reported on military matters and the course of the war. They were Richard M. Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Gen. William C. Westmoreland of the Joint chiefs.

Careful comparison with newspaper accounts for the appropriate days yields the following grim surprise:

The government apparently had no better information about the war than the press, which at the time considered its information dreadfully inadequate.

The Washington Post was not pleased when it had to report Indian claims and Pakistani counter-claims without being able to give readers a clear sense of

what was really happening.

But on Dec. 3, Helms told WSAG the following:

"Concerning the reported action in the West wing, there are conflicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along their border; but the Indian officials say this is a lie."

In a dispatch from Rawalpindi dated Dec. 3, Jim Hoagland reported to The Washington Post:

"Radio Pakistan announced tonight that India had launched attacks against Pakistani forward positions all along the western frontier and that Pakistani fighter planes retaliated with raids on four airfields in western India and Indian-held Kashmir."

"The airfields the Pakistanis announced hitting were given as Amritsar, Pathankot, Avantipur, near the northwest frontier and Srinagar, capital of Indian Kashmir."

In his account of military activity at the Dec. 4 meeting, Helms had caught up with Avantipur and a summary of the meeting said:

"Mr. Helms indicated that we do not know who started the current action, nor do we know why the Paks hit the four small airfields yesterday."

On the political side, Anderson quoted Wednesday from a briefing document prepared for the President's current meeting in San Clemente with Japanese Prime Minister Sato.

Those readers who have been following the dispatches of Washington Post correspondent Selig S. Harrison from Tokyo were apparently as well briefed as the President on the current Japanese attitude toward the U.S., international monetary affairs, military and more specifically nuclear matters and attitudes toward China.

The logical conclusion is not that the general public is always wonderfully well-informed, but that the government is sometimes woefully ill-informed.



*Joseph Kraft*

# The Anderson Papers

JACK ANDERSON achieved a journalistic coup in publishing the minutes of the secret White House meetings on the India-Pakistan crisis. But how much of a hero is the man who leaked the information?

My strong impression is that he accomplished very little public good, if any. On the contrary, his actions are almost certain to drive the Nixon administration deeper than ever into secret dealings on a restricted basis.

On the good side of the ledger, the leak has now provided unmistakable information that the President deliberately tilted American policy in favor of Pakistan and against India. But that much was known to everybody in touch with the State Department and White House at the time of the crisis.

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